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1. SUMMARY 
In many countries, administrative supervision has grown dramatically in recent years. Administrative 
supervision is a form of interaction between policy makers and policy executors, aimed at improving political 
accountability. In this paper, the role of information and information relationships between policy making bodies, 
executive institutions and administrative supervisors is explored. We identify three roles of administrative 
supervisors: a classical (cop) role, a modern (coach) role, and a networking (director) role. Each role has 
requirements with respect to the information relationship, particularly in the relationship between the supervisory 
authority and the executive institution. In this paper, we analyze the sometimes contradictory roles of 
administrative supervisors and the implications for information relationships, and we indicate the consequences for 
practice.  
 




Increasingly in the public sector, policy making is organizationally separated from policy 
execution [1, 2]. Sweden has about 300 agencies executing policy. In Japan, 84 independent 
administrative agencies exist and in the United Kingdom, 140 agencies either deliver services to 
the public or have a regulatory role. In the Netherlands, more than 600 independent 
administrative bodies execute policies in the fields of social security, housing, public health, et 
cetera, on behalf of policy making body. Furthermore, many municipalities are involved in the 
execution of delegated tasks on behalf of national policy making bodies.  
Examples of policy areas in the Netherlands in which policy making and policy execution are 
separated, are: the execution of national Student Loan Schemes by the executive institution ‘IB 
Groep’ and the provision of building permits by municipalities based on building legislation by 
the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment.  
The notion of separating policy execution is a part of a cluster of ideas, ranging from cutting 
down ‘red tape’, financial transparency, decentralization of authority, the use of performance 
indicators and the creation of market-like mechanisms in government. This cluster of ideas is 
often labeled new public management (NPM).  
NPM in general, and the autonomization of policy execution in particular, raises fundamental 
questions of political control and political accountability in policy networks of public sector 
organizations1. It is believed that the separation of policy making and policy execution, and the 
emergence of policy networks instead of unitary bureaucracies, decreases the traditional control 
over policy execution by policy makers and intensifies the need for explicit accountability 
requirements to be imposed on executive institutions. Hood et al conclude that because of what 
they refer to as recent preoccupations with rolling back bureaucracy, putting agencies at arm’s 
length and empowering public sector managers, there seems to be a growing emphasis on 
accountability achieved through auditing, inspection, licensing and so forth [3]. Accountability 
requirements can be viewed as means to achieve political accountability, but also as means to 
achieve quality assurance in a policy process as a whole, and as an instrument to emphasize 
enforcement as the final element of a chain of policy processes.  
An instrument which has been increasingly emphasized for promoting accountability is 
administrative supervision or administrative surveillance. In the above context, we define 
administrative supervision as the interaction between a policy making body or an independent 
supervisory body (or supervisory authority) on the one hand and an executive institution on the 
                                                 
1 In this context, there is a striking parallel with the private sector, where the notion of corporate 
governance is being discussed both in theory as well as in practice.  
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other hand, which is aimed at gathering information on how a policy is executed, evaluating and 
possibly adjusting by issuing sanctions (Figure 1). Hood et al add the condition of legality (the 
supervisor is required to have an official mandate to supervise and to change the supervised 
organization’s behavior) [3].  
In the remainder of this paper, we ask what role information and information relationships 
play in the context of administrative supervision, and analyze the soundness of exchanges of 
information between supervisory authorities and executive institutions. This question is relevant 
for a number of reasons.  
First, it is interesting to note that the increased attention for administrative supervision is often 
described in conjunction with trends emphasizing political and public accountability. In a Dutch 
policy document, for example, it is stated that information is important in processes of 
administrative supervision, and that it is necessary to specify and formalize information 
relationships in information statutes and information protocols as much as possible: “[i]f political 
responsibility is to be affected in practice, then the minister should be able to gather information 
in order for him to decide upon appropriate action (...) Monitoring and detection of possible 
risks should be undertaken in a timely fashion and the information relationships should be 
handled adequately” [4]. Bekkers has shown that in many policy networks, a cybernetic view of 
information relationships dominates [5, 6].  
Second, the (partly) newly developed relationships between policy making bodies, supervisory 
authorities and executive institutions compel actors to think about the kind of institutional rules 
which should be used in the interaction (including the exchange of information) between policy 
makers and executive institutions. This aspect relates to the fact that information relationships 
are part of general administrative relationships between institutions and that matters of 
institutional trust, for example, are relevant.  
Third, the availability of both information technologies (the means to store and analyze data) 
as well as well as communication technologies (the means to gather, exchange and disperse 
information) has become widespread and thus there is a potential for developing 
interorganizational information systems [7, 8] in administrative supervision practice. As has been 
mentioned earlier, information and communication technologies enable the properties of 
calculation and transaction, transparency, communication and interaction and even visualization 
through the use of virtual reality techniques in policy processes.  
In order to answer the research questions mentioned above, we first turn to the concept of 
administrative supervision and the ideal typical roles supervisory authorities can play (Section 2). 
Subsequently, information relationships in the context of each role are described and the critical 
success factors and political risks of information relationships are identified (Section 3). Section 4 
provides an analysis of cases of administrative supervision in the Dutch public sector. 
Conclusions are provided in Section 5.  
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3. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION 
3.1 A Preliminary Demarcation  
Administrative supervision has grown dramatically in the past two decades. Various forms of 
administrative supervision can be discerned in the literature, so a demarcation must be made.  
An important part of the increase in administrative supervision (Power even talks about the 
‘audit explosion’ [9]) has taken place because of the emergence of audit and regulatory bodies 
acting as guard dogs with respect to the functioning of newly liberalized markets (and thus, with 
respect to, for example, telecom companies and financial institutions). Another category is 
represented by regulators that promote compliance of companies and citizens, for example with 
environmental legislation (an activity that is often referred to as ‘enforcement’). This type of 
supervisory authorities is not analyzed in detail. We limit ourselves to supervisors that operate 
purely within the public sector.  
But even within the public sector, various types of administrative supervisors can be 
distinguish and Hood et al have concluded that there is a sharp increase in organizations that are 
concerned with ‘regulation-inside-government’ [3]. Within this category, in this article, we do not 
focus on supervisors who scrutinize both policy making bodies and policy executing institutions 
(like Courts of Audit). Rather, we study the type of supervision by or on behalf of policy making 
bodies with respect to institutions that execute policies. In general, in this specific context, 
administrative supervision of and accountability for executive public organizations is aimed at 
increasing the transparency of policy processes. In order to do this, information has to be 
exchanged between one or more policy making bodies, one or more supervisory authorities and 
executive institutions (and, eventually, parliament). The necessity of information exchange, and 
the underlying ‘quest’ for transparency, raises questions with respect to the potential of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) because it has been argued that ICTs are 
capable of increasing transparency [6], stimulating openness of government and enhancing 
interorganizational cooperation spanning various administrative agencies [10]. 
Thus, in this article, we assume that the ultimate aim of administrative supervision is to 
promote transparency, in order to enable politicians (and public managers acting on their behalf) 
to form their own opinion as to the quality of the execution of tasks practiced by the executive 
organizations in question. Information regarding the quality of the execution can be obtained 
either by supervising the performance of the statutory tasks in question by policy making bodies, 
or by arranging for a third party (an independent supervisory authority) to exercise supervision 
on behalf of policy making bodies.  
3.2 Roles of Supervisory Authorities 
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In this article, we view administrative supervision in the context of steering (in networks of 
organizations). Although the descriptions and demarcations of supervisory authorities presented 
above seem to indicate a more or less precise conception of supervisory authorities and their 
activities, it is possible to identify a variety of roles supervisory authorities can perform [11, 12], 
just like there is a variety of steering modalities in networks of organizations [5].  
3.2.1 Administrative Supervision and Steering 
In general, activities of governments can be characterized in terms of planning, policy making 
and policy execution, and administrative supervision is also a part of these activities; moreover, it 
is a form of steering. Steering can be defined as a form of intended control within a particular 
context [13]. Supervisory authorities, likewise, attempt to monitor and possibly change the way 
policy is executed by an executive institution, and they do this on behalf of a policy making body. 
If administrative supervision is seen as a form of steering, this raises questions with respect to the 
particular context in which steering takes place. In this paper, three different contexts are 
explored.  
The first one is a ‘classical’ context [5, 14]. In a classical context, supervisory authority has a 
classical role, and the basis for steering is a planning and control-like approach in which an omni-
rational central institutional actor attempts to influence its environment. The basic belief here is 
that the more information such a central actor possesses, the better it can plan, monitor and 
control.  
The second one is a ‘modern’ context. This context and role more or less originated in 
criticism of the plan and control fallacy. Rather than controlling in a distant manner, a modern 
context assumes ‘Vernetzung’, i.e. intertwinement between government and society and between 
various government organizations. Steering does not take the form of planning and controlling 
the outside world, but rather influencing the interdependencies and organizational boundaries of 
various organizations.  
The third one is a ‘network’ context. This context stretches the modern context a bit more, 
and assumes that government itself is positioned within society. The way to steer is to change 
interdependencies in the network it is part of itself, and change the formation of networks by 
inviting third parties to join the network thereby attempting to establish checks and balances.  
In the next three subsections, the three roles of supervisory authorities are derived from the 
various steering contexts.  
3.2.2 Classical Role 
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The first role of a supervisory authority is a classical role which relates to the classical context. 
This role more or less represents intergovernmental relationships in the 19th century when the 
emphasis was on a strict and  explicit definition of duties and responsibilities of government [12], 
and on a uni-centric form of democracy in which all public authorities were ultimately 
accountable to parliament for their actions. In essence, in this role, the executive institution is 
principally subordinate to the policy making body (the political principal), and may demonstrate 
deviant behavior in practice which requires correction.  
In a classical role, also referred to as ‘supervision by screening’, there is a clear separation of 
tasks between (1) supervisory authority and (2) executive institution ([11, 12]; see also [5]). The 
objective of the supervisory authority is to (incidentally) correct those situations which do not 
conform to specified norms. The supervisory authority does not have any executive tasks of its 
own, but merely observes, gathers information, compares observations with norms, and 
intervenes (sanctions) or has another authority (for example, a policy making body) intervene.  
Relevant questions for the supervisory authority in a classical role are (see also [4]): 
- Does the executive institution function conform to the legal norms? 
- Does the executive institution function conform to general norms like equity before the 
law, et cetera, and is this reflected in periodical and systematic measurements? 
- Does the executive institution function properly in terms of internal, financial 
management? 
Essential for the supervisory authority in a classical role is that it is an enabler of political 
accountability in a chain, linking the execution of policies by executive institutions through policy 
making bodies, and ending in accountability to politicians in parliament. Duties and 
responsibilities in various links in the chains are separated, and sanctioning is predominantly 
repressive (e.g., dismissing and/or replacing executives of, for example, executive institutions). 
Administrative supervision in a classical model is furthermore characterized by a lack of mutual 
empathy and a quest for control, compliance and obedience [15].  
The metaphor that may be used to describe the supervisory authority in its classical role is the 
metaphor of the ‘cop’ or ‘police office’ (an enforcer of the law). 
3.2.3 Modern Role 
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A second role of a supervisory authority is a ‘modern’ role which relates to the modern 
context. In a modern role, activities of the supervisory authority and the executive institution are 
intertwined. The interaction between these two organizations can vary in terms of intensity and 
frequency, and there is a close relationship between the tasks of the organizations involved. The 
quality of how a policy is executed is a joint responsibility of the executive institution and the 
supervisory authority (which is a clear departure from the ‘classical’ role of supervision by 
screening). Norms are neither static nor explicit, and are aimed at the quality of the policy as a 
whole (instead of the execution of a specific piece of legislation). Rather than supervision by 
screening, this form of administrative supervision can be described as ‘supervision-by-steering’.  
In a modern role, a supervisory authority can execute tasks that are adjacent to or overlapping 
with tasks of the executive institution, and duties and responsibilities may be intertwined. 
According to this role, there should not be too large a gap between the policy making body, 
supervisory authority and executive institution. In general, classical administrative supervision’s 
basic assumptions of distrust, control and obedience are replaced by mutual professional respect 
and remoteness [15]. Norms and standards used in a modern role are not static, but situational 
and subject to negotiation between supervisory authority and executive institution. The metaphor 
which can most adequately describe this role is the metaphor of the ‘coach’ or ‘consultant’ [16].  
3.2.4 Network Role 
A third role of a supervisory authority is a ‘networking’ (or postmodern) role. Essential to the 
network role is the assumption that the political chain of command is not the only forum for 
accountability. Rather, it is assumed that various arenas exist in which, for example, executive 
institutions are held accountable for how they execute their (public) tasks. For example, a school 
may be asked to account for the way they execute tasks (1) to a ministry of education or an 
educational inspectorate with respect to conformance to educational goals, (2) to (regional or 
national) safety boards with respect to safety (3) to (regional or national) environmental agencies 
with respect to environmental aspects and (4) to parents who have sent their children to the 
school (or, in general: to the buyers of services rendered by the executive institution). This 
fictitious example shows that there are often various arenas in which an executive institution has 
to account for its actions. 
In general, in the networking role, the emphasis is not on accountability per se, but rather on 
the creation of ‘checks and balances’ in the field of the executive institution, and on the creation 
of productive competition and co-operation between various supervisory authorities. For 
example, with respect to specific topics, executive institutions may experience that various 
supervisory authorities operate in adjacent or even slightly overlapping tasks. In the networking 
role, supervisory authorities may either (1) enter into a form of (productive) competition in 
which they compete with one another and try to render the ‘best’ supervision services to the 
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policy making body (political principal) or (2) create ‘checks and balances’ between various 
executive institutions or between executive institutions and the public to which services are 
rendered. For example, an environmental supervisory authority may publish the environmental 
performance of a municipality, thereby attempting to influence the general public to raise their 
voice. Thus, ‘naming and shaming’ is an important feature of postmodern supervision. Websites 
on the World Wide Web have proved to be an interesting medium for exposing the performance 
of executive institutions. In both cases, it should be clear that the principal role of a supervisory 
authority is to constitute a network, or, to speak in terms of Rhodes [17], to regulate relationships 
in a complex system.  
3.2.5 Organizational Learning in Administrative Supervision 
Apart from the differences in orientation or even metaphor used to describe them, the roles 
can also be distinguished by referring to the type of (inter)organizational learning that takes place. 
In a classical role, the actual performance of an executive institution is confronted with relatively 
static norms, and if a significant deviation is noted, corrective measures are taken by the 
supervisory authority. This type of behavior can be classified as single loop learning.  
In modern style administrative supervision, norms are ambiguous, and in negotiations between 
supervisory authority and executive institutions, the underlying policy assumptions of the 
executive institution are questioned. Such a form of learning has many characteristics of double 
loop learning.  
The learning style of the network role, moreover, is based on the feature of connectivity in a 
network [18]. Supervisory authorities activate network participants (which may be other 
supervisory authorities, or groups of citizens acting as a supervisory authority) by means of 
sharing or combining information. Hence, connectivity here is the basis for organizational 
learning in a network.  
The roles of supervisory authorities are summarized in Figure 2.  
4. INFORMATION RELATIONSHIPS: CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS AND RISKS 
4.1 Introduction  
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In responding to incidents regarding administrative supervision, the Dutch Minister of the 
Interior said: “Take a look at information and information gathering [...] We treat information as 
if it is to be written down and submitted in order to be filed in a file cabinet. It should be treated 
as an information agenda. [...] We in the public sector are working with outdated methods and 
institutional structures. But we have reached an era in which information and openness of 
information should affect our work in a qualitative way” [19]. This quotation raises questions 
regarding the formation of information relationships in the various roles of administrative 
supervision mentioned previously. With information relationships, we refer to sets of agreements 
regarding how information is exchanged in the context of administrative supervision, including 
agreements on quality control mechanisms.  
Based on the discussion of the various roles of administrative supervisors above, it is now 
possible to analyze the information relationships that occur in any of the (ideal-typical) roles 
presented so far.  
4.2 Critical Success Factors in Information Relationships of Various 
Supervisory Roles 
In a classical role, the information relationship between supervisory authority and executive 
institution should reflect clarity and lack of ambiguity. The relationship should be clearly 
formalized and based on legislation, and this should include a clear demarcation and description 
of duties and responsibilities. If there is more than one supervisory authority, the duties and 
responsibilities of the various authorities should be clearly demarcated and formalized. In general, 
the information relationships are based on an in-depth information requirements analysis, and it 
is clear at what moments in time specific information is exchanged in the relationship, and to 
what kind of norms the exchanges should conform. These properties can be formalized in 
information statutes or information protocols.  
In general, an information relationship in a classical role reflects the characteristics of a 
classical bureaucratic arrangement, with an emphasis on clarity and robustness (see Figure 3).   
In a modern role, moreover,  it is explicitly acknowledged that the interaction between 
supervisory authority and executive institution has a dynamic, continuous and more or less 
unpredictable character [5, 12]. Therefore, the focus is not so much on robustness, but on 
flexibility. In relation to the information relationship, this implies that the exchange of 
information is continually subject to intergovernmental negotiation. In order to make this work, 
however, certain requirements must be observed. First, there is the requirement of (a perception 
of) equality of position in the relationship between the supervisory authority and the executive 
institution. Second, the parties involved should acknowledge each other’s professionalism. Third, 
the availability of mutually acknowledged systems of certification is required to stimulate a certain 
amount of self regulation at the executive institution (see Figure 4).  
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In a network role, the focus is not primarily on the interaction between supervisory authority 
and executive institution, but on the (establishment of) an information relationship in the 
network in which the executive institution operates. This can include information relationships 
between supervisory authority and executive institution, the sharing of knowledge and 
information between various authorities that supervise the executive institution, but it can also 
include the exposure of performance of the executive institution by a supervisory authority in 
order to create ‘checks and balances’ in the organizational network of which the executive 
institution is a part. By exposing the performance of an executive institution, the supervisory 
authority mobilizes the groups of citizens who receive the services rendered by the executive 
institution so they can raise their voices and act as supervisory bodies themselves.  
In order to make a network role possible, there should be a number of (potential) supervisory 
authorities that have adjacent or slightly overlapping supervisory tasks. The various supervisory 
authorities should experience a form of creative competition, in the sense that they are exposed 
to incentives urging them to deliver supervisory services of a high quality to the political 
principal. This implies that supervisory competition should be open to new entrants, and closed 
one-on-one relationships between supervisory authorities and executive institutions should be 
avoided (see Figure 5). 
Summarizing, every role of a supervisory authority is accompanied by its own critical success 
factors. In a classical role, it is of the utmost importance that the legal framework (duties and 
responsibilities of the supervisory authority) are clear and formalized, methods of administrative 
supervision are documented and information relationships are clear in the sense that the 
information requirements of policy making bodies and supervisory authorities are systematically 
analyzed and implemented in information statutes and protocols. Any breach of these conditions 
results in political risks for the policy making body. In a modern role, it is essential that there is (a 
perception of) equality in the supervisory authority and the executive institution, and that both 
organizations respect each other’s professional norms. A lack of equality and respect will result in 
distrust and failure in organizational learning processes. In a network role, the most important 
condition is that there is a network surrounding the executive institution, and that it is possible 
for an supervisory authority to activate either (1) other supervisory authorities or (2) groups of 
citizens to engage themselves with the executive institution.  
 
5. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION IN PRACTICE 
5.1 Method  
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In order to investigate how supervisory authorities use information in their daily practice and 
to examine how executive institutions, supervisory authorities and policy making bodies deal with 
information relationships, we analyzed six case studies of supervisory authorities in the 
Netherlands using our analytical framework consisting of roles of supervisory authorities and 
their respective critical success factors and risks. We analyzed three case studies based on 
document analysis. These were the Education Inspectorate, Social Security Supervisory Board 
and Center for Vehicle Technology and Information. Furthermore, we also analyzed three case 
studies in-depth (based on document analysis, interviews and on-site observation): the Local 
Residential Taxes Supervisory Authority, Inspectorate of Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment and various supervisory authorities that supervised Defense institutions.  
In the remainder of this section, we present (1) general observations and (2) problems of 
administrative supervision and information relationships, and categorize them under three 
headings: institutional problems of supervision (Section 4.2), institutional problems of 
information relationships (Section 4.3), and operational problems of information relationships 
(Section 4.4). We include illustrations and references to the empirical setting where appropriate.  
5.2 Institutional Problems of Supervision 
5.2.1 Tension Between Roles of Cop and Coach 
In various cases, supervisory authorities attempted to mix the roles of cop and coach at the 
same time (Education Inspectorate, Local Residential Taxes Supervisory Authority, Inspectorate 
of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment). This resulted in hybrid constellations, and in 
specific problems. For example, the cases of both Local Residential Taxes Supervisory Authority 
and the Inspectorate of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment revealed that the idea of 
a supervisory authority, acting as a coach, appealed to municipalities. In fact, they were very 
enthusiastic about the idea of an supervisory authority that would help them in deciding upon 
appropriate levels of staff, in establishing procedures and in dealing with external software 
suppliers. However, municipalities were afraid that the information that they supplied to the 
modern supervisory authority (‘coach’) could be used against them in the future if the supervisory 
authority acted in a classical role (‘as a police officer’). This anecdote shows that it is not always 
possible to pick various elements of supervisory roles and assemble them together in a one-size-
fits-all solution.  
5.2.2 Inconsistency in Institutional Design of Administrative Supervisory 
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Sometimes, organizational designs are institutionalized that are not commensurable with the 
role and position of the supervisory authority. In the case of the Local Residential Taxes 
Supervisory Authority, the formal task of the supervisory authority was to be an independent 
supervisory authority, operating in a more or less classical role. However, the Board of the 
supervisory authority consists of various representatives of the organizations under supervision, 
such as municipalities, local water authorities, et cetera.  Obviously, the aspect of representation 
of various interests has taken precedence over the implementation of an organizational design 
that reflects an independent position for the supervisory authority.  
5.2.3 Institutional Distrust 
In general, the basis for administrative supervision is a feeling of distrust. As a result, 
institutionalizing administrative supervision can be regarded as institutionalizing distrust in a way 
that is acceptable to all parties concerned. But when the policy in a specific policy sector is very 
sensitive, or when relationships between various parties have become extremely polarized, the 
way administrative supervision has been institutionalized can be severely criticized and 
counterproductive competition appears. The case of the (now abolished as a result of continuous 
domain struggles) Social Security Supervisory Authority revealed that various amendments and 
continuous changes in the legislation continually fuelled the struggle between (1) supervisory 
authority and policy making body, and (2) supervisory authority and several executive 
institutions. In this specific case, the exchange of information was obstructed because of disputes 
over positions, duties and responsibilities of various organizations, and so forth.  
5.2.4 Catch-22 
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A network role of the supervisory authority implies that supervision involves activating (by a 
focal supervisory authority) other supervisory authorities, by means of sharing information, or 
even activating citizens to raise their voices. In our case studies, the Inspectorate of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment issued a press communiqué to the local press in which 
their major findings of visits to municipalities were reported. The Education Inspectorate has 
published the findings of school visits on the website of the Inspectorate2. Co-operation between 
various supervisory authorities occurred in the policy fields of social security and education. In 
practice, however, there is a risk that ‘Catch-22’ situations can emerge: the responsibility for the 
supervision is unclear, and organizations-under-supervision are able to play various supervisory 
authorities off against one another. This happened in our case study of Defense institutions, 
where organizations-under-supervision used contradictory information requests issued by several 
supervisory authorities as an excuse for failing to submit information to any supervisory 
authority.  
5.3 Institutional Problems of Information Relationships  
The exchange of information between various formally autonomous organizations is not 
always a neutral activity. Homburg has described that the exchange of information among 
autonomous organizations can change interdependencies between organizations, and that 
organizations anticipate this by carefully selecting what information to exchange, and what 
information not to exchange [7, 8]. In other words, administrative supervision in a way creates an 
arena in which not only information is exchanged, but also in which interorganizational 
relationships are modified and balances of power between formally autonomous organizations 
are affected. This notion of an arena explains why organizations are not always willing to 
exchange information, and why executive institutions attempt to defend  their position vis-à-vis 
the policy making body and/or the supervisory authority by overloading information channels 
(so-called ‘data-wars’). We have not come across these data-wars in a strict sense in our studies, 
but in the cases of the Center for Vehicle Technology and Information, the Local Residential 
Taxes Supervisory Authority and Inspectorate of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 
Inspectorate, there were more or less constant quarrels over what information was to be given 
‘away’ by the organizations under supervision.  
5.4 Operational Problems of Information Relationships  
                                                 
2 The URL of the website is http://www.onderwijsinspectie.nl  
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In practice, any role of a supervisory authority has to be implemented. In some cases, we 
found that specific norms had not been operationalized (which is a problem in a classical role), 
nor was the supervisory authority willing to negotiate these norms (which is a requirement of the 
modern role). For example, in the case of the Inspectorate of Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment Inspectorate, it was unclear whether the execution of the legislation was under 
scrutiny in the investigation of municipalities, or whether supervisory authorities were allowed to 
monitor the execution of tasks as a whole (including tasks like record keeping, which are not 
formalized in Acts).  
5.4.1 Inclusion or Exclusion of Supervision in Internal Processes 
Seen from the perspective of an organization under supervision, administrative supervision 
requires reaction to many information requests. If there are various supervisory authorities, it is 
likely that information requests will result in substantial work for executive organizations. Many 
organizations try to cope with this demanding supervisory environment by aligning the ‘external’ 
information requests as much as possible with internal procedures and the structure of the 
internal information architecture. In doing so, it can more easily cope with a variety of 
information requests. This way of dealing with information requests can be characterized as 
‘inclusion of external information requests’. A potential danger of inclusion of external 
information requests is that the exclusive attention decreases and that the function of supervisory 
authorities is hollowed out.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this article, we have analyzed information relationships in the context of administrative 
supervision. We have demonstrated that the concept of administrative supervision is a broad one, 
and that it is possible to derive three roles for a supervisory authority: a classical role (the police 
officer metaphor), a modern role (the coach or consultant metaphor) and a network role (the 
networker of director metaphor). In each of the roles, information relationships bring along 
various sets of critical success factors. In Sections 2 and 3, a conceptual framework consisting of 
various critical success factors for each of the roles, was presented.  
In many cases, we have seen that there is an implicit preference for a classical role for the 
supervisory authority. Such a role is intuitively attractive. In practice, however, many executive 
institutions have an institutionally anchored, relatively autonomous position, and assuming 
classical information relationships in these situations creates many tensions and problems. 
Consequently, the exchange of information is often a part of game-playing between relatively 
autonomous organizations, and it seems clear that information is rarely a neutral resource. 
Information exchange affects the positions of organizations in networks, and may be used to 
preserve autonomy, affect traditional dependencies, et cetera, possibly in data wars.  
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In our empirical investigations, we have furthermore demonstrated that in practice, there may 
seem to be a deliberate strategy towards administrative supervision, but it seems to be hard to 
implement this strategy in the daily routines of the supervisory authority and the organization 
under supervision. This results in questions with respect to the operationalization of 
administrative supervision in information relationship, especially in the operationalization of 
norms and standards.  
Furthermore, supervisory authorities sometimes have a somewhat vague idea of the role they 
are supposed to play. This may imply an organizational set up of the supervisory authority that 
reflects internal inconsistencies, but it may also imply inconsistencies with respect to the design 
and proper functioning of information relationships. These inconsistencies especially appear 
when classical and modern roles are mixed. In this case, there is opportunity for misuse of 
information, which can result in institutional distrust between supervisory authorities and 
executive institutions.  
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